Enhancing network forensics with particle swarm and deep learning: The
  particle deep framework by Koroniotis, Nickolaos & Moustafa, Nour
ENHANCING NETWORK FORENSICS with
PARTICLE SWARM and DEEP LEARNING: THE
PARTICLE DEEP FRAMEWORK
Nickolaos Koroniotis1 and Nour Moustafa1
School of Engineering and Information Technology, University of New South Wales Canberra,
Canberra, Australia
n.koroniotis@student.adfa.edu.au
Abstract. The popularity of IoT smart things is rising, due to the automation they
provide and its effects on productivity. However, it has been proven that IoT devices
are vulnerable to both well established and new IoT-specific attack vectors. In this
paper, we propose the Particle Deep Framework, a new network forensic framework
for IoT networks that utilised Particle Swarm Optimisation to tune the hyperpa-
rameters of a deep MLP model and improve its performance. The PDF is trained
and validated using Bot-IoT dataset, a contemporary network-traffic dataset that
combines normal IoT and non-IoT traffic, with well known botnet-related attacks.
Through experimentation, we show that the performance of a deep MLP model is
vastly improved, achieving an accuracy of 99.9% and false alarm rate of close to 0%.
Keywords: Network forensics, Particle swarm optimization, Deep Learning, IoT,
Botnets
1 Introduction
With more than 7 billion devices deployed in 2018 and double that number in
2019, smart IoT things are becoming ever more popular, as they provide automated
services that improve performance and productivity, while reducing operating costs
[1]. Various applications of the IoT have been developed, such as the smart home
comprised of home appliances like smart lights and fridges, and on a larger scale
the Industrial IoT (IIoT) that spans areas such as industry, healthcare, agriculture
and automation. The next step is considered to be the ”smart city”, where smart
things will be used to monitor and control powerplants, public transport, water
supply and more [1].
However, it has been proven that IoT devices are vulnerable to both well estab-
lished and new IoT-specific attack vectors. In a 2018 report by Symantec regarding
the security threats found in the Internet [2], it was reported that the total num-
ber of attacks targeting IoT devices for 2018 exceeded 57,000, with more than
5,000 attacks being recorded each month. Hackers have compromised vulnerable,
unpatched or unencrypted IoT devices in order to steal sensitive data, corrupt the
device’s normal operation, spread malware infections [3][4][2] or even compromise
the security of a smart home by disabling smart locks and garage doors [5].
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Due to the lack of common standards and heterogeneity displayed by the IoT
[3], the development of an efficient network forensic solution becomes difficult [6], as
there may be multiple diverse protocols in use in a single deployment [7,8,9]. Typi-
cally, the network forensic process is segmented into several distinct phases, whereby
each phase defines the necessary preparation, analysis and actions of investigation
[10], with these phases being identification, collection, preservation, examination,
analysis and presentation. The first three phases define access to the crime scene,
detection of potential sources of evidence, secure collection of digital artifacts and
traces and their preservation. Examination and analysis define the actions neces-
sary to identify useful evidence in the collected data, and then inferences are made
about the crime, while the presentation stage prepares the identified information
to be presented in court of law.
Many forensic frameworks that rely on the public ledger scheme have been de-
veloped, although they focus on the acquisition stage rather than the entire inves-
tigation phase [8] [11] [12] [13]. By relying on a public ledger scheme, the integrity
of evidence would be guarantied, while experts would have immediate access to
it. These frameworks however, do not cover the examination and analysis stages,
and may introduce some disadvantages to the forensic process such as privacy con-
cerns, as the user’s data is distributed between stakeholders while adding excess
complexity
During a forensic investigation, some aspect of a computer system is examined
to identify traces. One source that is preferred for IoT investigations, is traffic
collection, with two main approaches: deep packet inspection and network flow
analysis. Deep packet inspection focuses on the payload allowing for an in-depth
analysis. Network flow analysis summarizes network traffic, by ignoring the payload
and utilising statistical data like connection speed and exchanged bits. For the
requirements of the research presented in this paper, network flow is preferred, as
we suggest in this work [3].
Since IoT devices are designed to be continuously active, collecting traffic from
such a network would result in excessive volumes of data. As such, to analyse the
collected data, fast and automated methods are employed, with one prominent
example being deep learning that is ideal for rapidly scanning large volumes of
network data to detect patterns that indicate and attack [14,15,16,17]. However, in
order to utilise a deep learning model, it first needs to be trained, which involves
selecting hyperparameters, the values of which can greatly affect its performance
[18,19]. Thus, researchers have sought to develop ways of selecting optimal values
for a model’s hyperparameters [20,18,21,22], with an emphasis given towards more
automated processes. Regardless, no single optimization method has been accepted
as the preferred method by the research community and as such, the research is
ongoing. It is a necessity to develop network forensic-based optimisation to timely
investigate security incidents in IoT networks [23,3,24] .
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
– We propose a new network forensic framework, named Particle Deep Framework
(PDF), based on optimisation and deep learning.
– We use an optimization method based on Particle Swarm Optimization(PSO)
to select the hyperparameters of the Deep Neural Network (DNN).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 includes background and
related research in the application of particle swarm optimisation and deep neural
networks to network forensics. Section 3 presents our proposed Particle Deep Frame-
work in detail. Section 4 presents and discusses the experimental results acquired
by utilising our PDF. In Section 5 we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of
the PDF. Finally, Section 6 includes the concluding remarks of this paper.
2 Background and Related Work
2.1 Digital Forensics
Due to the malicious actions of hackers who take advantage of vulnerabilities present
in popular technologies, the field of digital forensics emerged. Through digital foren-
sics, experts examine a crime scene, gather data that are then processed and anal-
ysed in order to identify a hacker’s methods and target, a process that can lead
to prosecution [25]. Since it was first introduced, digital forensics has been sepa-
rated into specialized sub-disciplines, each ideal for different areas, such as: cloud
forensics, IoT forensics, network forensics and data forensics [26].
Network forensics, which is the subdiscipline that we utilise in this paper, exam-
ines security network-related security incidents, with collected data spanning from
logs to packet captured. Practitioners of network forensics often employ automated
software and hardware tools for the collection and preservation of data, however,
the process of performing a forensic examination is not rigidly defined. This has
resulted in the emergence of various digital forensic frameworks, which determine
the correct course of action during an investigation, separating the process into
autonomous stages and suggesting appropriate tools and techniques for each task.
Even though many forensic frameworks have been proposed [12,27,11], existing so-
lutions for smart homes give emphasis on acquisition and neglect examination and
analysis. Furthermore, no single framework has been acknowledged as superior, due
to lack of standardization in IoT and heterogeneity of computer systems [28,29,3].
Various researches have proposed forensic frameworks for IoT environments [8]
[11] [12] [13]. Hossain et al citehossain2018probe proposed Probe-IoT, an acqui-
sition framework that establishes chain of custody, while ensuring that privacy is
maintained. An acquisition model for smart vehicles named Block4Forensic was pro-
posed by Cebe et al. [13]. Both Probe-IoT and Block4Forensic utilise a blockchain to
ensure the integrity of the collected data, which includes diagnostic and interaction
data acquired from IoT devices.
Most of the proposed IoT frameworks were constructed by using distributed
blockchains [27,11,12]. Hossain et al. [12] proposed Probe-IoT and [11] FIF-IoT,
Le et al. [27] developed BIFF. These frameworks utilise a distributed blockchain,
managed by several entities like the manufacturers, the police and insurance com-
panies, with pre-approved roles and digital signatures ensuring confidentiality and
non-repudiation. For the issuing of digital keys necessary for the digital signatures,
a certification authority needs to be established, that will also manage the public-
keys and avoid main-in-the-middle attacks [30].
While these acquisition frameworks may improve an investigation, by providing
easy access to collected data, they have some drawbacks. To begin with, for the
frameworks to function effectively, law enforcement need to invest in resources to
store and manage the collected data, multiple independent organisations need to
collaborate seamlessly while owners of IoT devices need to agree and trust the
organisations that may access their data [12,27,11]. In addition, owners may face
extra charges due to the introduction of dedicated devices for data collection, or
deterioration of their device’s performance and increases in power consumption due
to transmissions to services that incorporate the collected data to the blockchain.
2.2 Deep Learning for tracing and discovering threat behaviours
Commonly, network forensic applications have incorporated a number of techniques
based on mathematics and machine learning, such as fuzzy logic, na¨ıve bayes classi-
fiers, support vector machines and neural networks [31,32,33,34]. However, contem-
porary research has proposed deep learning as an alternative as, long training times
notwithstanding, deep models tend to outperform other solutions when tasked with
processing large volumes of data [35,36,3,14,17].
Consisting of both discriminative and generative models, deep learning is a
subgroup of neural networks, that is designed to incorporate multiple hidden layers
and neurons in what is known as a ”deep architecture” [37,14]. By stacking multiple
(in the thousands) hidden layers, a deep learning model is capable of detecting more
complex patterns, along with their variations, than simpler and shallower neural
networks [14,18].
As an application of network forensics, deep learning has been employed for
attack detection in network traces, with multiple examples in research. Shone et
al. [14] designed an intrusion detection system (IDS) comprised of a pre-trained,
non-symmetric deep autoencoder stacked with a random forest. The IDS, trained
on the KDD dataset achieved an 89.22% accuracy. For the purpose of malware
detection, Azmoodeh et al. [36] developed a deep convolutional neural network,
that was trained on eigenvectors obtained from smartphone application code. The
model achieved 98% precision and accuracy.
Brun et al. [38] investigated the detection of denial of service and sleep attacks
targeting IoT gateways, and proposed a detection method based on a random neural
network model although, its performance was similar to a threshold detector. A deep
learning model based on MLP was proposed by Pektas et al. [39] that focused on
detecting botnets by flagging C&C traffic. Results indicated that the performance
of deep learning models, when tasked with identifying botnets in network flows,
was acceptable.
One of the first steps in utilising Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) for
deep packet inspection, named D2PI, was proposed by Cheng et al. [40]. This
system was trained on extracted traffic payload data, with the CNN receiving a
fixed input. Results reported by the researchers were promising. Alrashdi et al. [41]
developed AD-IoT, an anomaly NIDS designed to identify infected IoT devices.
The NIDS utilised a random forest and extra tree classifiers and was evaluated on
the UNSW-NB15 dataset, with results being promising.
Previous work on forensic frameworks for the IoT has either focused on the
acquisition aspect of a forensic investigation [12,?,?], or requires alterations to the
smartphone applications associated with a smart device [42]. As such, the frame-
work proposed in this research, the PDF, is an important and practical addition
to the network forensic research literature, as it incorporates both the examination
and analysis phases by using deep learning and network flow data, without the need
for alterations to IoT system architectures.
2.3 The Particle Swarm Optimization algorithm
In order to tune the hyperparameter values of a deep MLP model, in the context of
this paper, we employed Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO). PSO is a metaheuris-
tic swarm-based optimisation algorithm developed by Eberheart and Kennedy in
1995 [43]. At the start of PSO, a swarm of particles is randomly generated, and
tasked with exploring a variable search space, with each position being a new value
for the variable that is being optimised. During each iteration, a particle’s velocity
and local position, as-well-as the global best position are updated, based on its
previous position, its best-detected position (value) and the swarm’s best position
[44,45]. The quality of a particle’s location is determined by an objective function.
The original PSO algorithm proposed by Kennedy et al. [43], which is explained
by equations 3-6, was followed by a number of variants, each designed for differ-
ent scenarios. For example, Kennedy et al. proposed in their original work, that
the learning rates θ1 and θ2 in equation 5 greatly affect the search pattern of the
swarm, with increases in θ1 prioritizing local search while increases in θ2 spreading
the swarm. The next variant, called standard PSO, was proposed by Shi et al. [46]
and integrated an inertia coefficient to equation 5 and specifically, multiplied it to
the previous velocity value. As this inertia (ω) has a direct effect on a particle’s
trajectory, various initialization strategies have been proposed, such as setting it
to a positive, fixed value [46], random initialization [47] and using a function that
declines with time citenikabadi2008particle , with a linear example given in Equa-
tion 1. In Equation 1, ωmax and ωmin are user-defined maximum and minimum
weights, while i and imax indicate the the current and total number of iterations
of the swarm respectively. The justification for using a decaying inertia is to force
particles to spread-search at early intervals of the PSO, and then gravitate towards
identified optima.
ωt = ωmax − i
imax
∗ ωmax − ωmin (1)
Because experiments demonstrated the tendency of original and standard PSO
to cause the velocity of particles to explode, improvements were suggested, in the
form of velocity clamping and constriction factors [48,49,50]. Velocity clamping
binds a particle’s velocity to a pre-determined upper bound, while constriction
factors alter Equation 5, by multiplying the new velocity with a constriction factor
”K” given by Equation 2.
K = 2/|4− φ−
√
φ2 − 4φ|, whereφ = θ1 + θ2andφ > 4. (2)
Other variants for the PSO algorithm were designed, to allow its application to
new, previously not supported problems [51]. Some prominent examples include a
binary version of PSO [51], where the restricted velocity of a particle was calculated
and fed as input to a sigmoid function that produced a binary value (either ’0’ or
’1’). The cooperative PSO [52] was proposed for multi-dimensional problems, with
a new swarm spawned for each dimension. Finally, the fully informed PSO [53]
alters Equation 5 and uses the best position of neighbours to calculate a particle’s
new velocity.
3 The Particle Deep Framework
In this section, we introduce the Particle Deep Framework (PDF), a multi-staged
novel network forensic framework for detecting and analysing attacks and their ori-
gins in IoT networks, that combines deep learning and particle swarm optimisation
methods, as shown in Figure 1.
Next, the five stages depicted in in Figure 1 of the new PDF forensic framework
are expanded as follows.
– Stage 1: Network capturing Tools: In this stage, IoT devices capable
of accessing all local network traffic by being set in promiscuous mode, are
attached to a network that is under investigation. Specialised packet capturing
tools, such as Wireshark [54], Tcpdump [55] and Ettercap [56] are then employed
to collect network packets. As an example, for the purposes of developing the
Fig. 1. Proposed network forensic framework using particle swarm optimization and Multi-layer
Perceptron (MLP) deep learning algorithms.
Bot-IoT dataset [57], we employed T-shark [58], a terminal-based alternative to
Wireshark. Through the ”-i” command we specified the Network Interface Card
(NIC) to be used, which was set in promiscuous mode, allowing the collection
of all the generated packets in the local virtual network. The collected pcap files
are then utilised in the following data collection stage.
– Stage 2: Data Collection and Management Tools:
In this stage, data collection takes place, producing results like the Bot-IoT and
UNSW-NB15 datasets. To ensure the preservation of the collected data, the di-
gests of the pcap files are generated by using an SHA-256 hashing function [59].
Network flows are then generated from the collected pcaps, by using network
flow extraction tools like Argus [60] or Bro [61]. Further preprocessing actions
like feature normalization, elimination and extraction, improve the training pro-
cess of machine learning models at later stages. In the next stage, the produced
data is utilised by deep learning and particle swarm optimisation, to identify,
trace and analyse cyber-attacks.
– Stage 3: Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) for adapting hyperpa-
rameters of Deep Learning model:
In this stage, the hyperparameters of deep learning models are tuned by an
optimisation algorithm, with the PSO [45] chosen for the task, due to its con-
vergence speed compared to other evolutionary algorithms [44,62]. In this study,
the PSO was used to identify hyperparameters that periodically maximise the
Area Under Curve (AUC) of a deep Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) model. The
identified hyperparameters are then used to train the final version of the MLP
model.
– Stage 4: MLP deep learning for attack identification:
In this stage, the preprocessed data from Stage 2 and the tuned hyperparam-
eters of Stage 3 are utilised to train and evaluate a deep MLP model. For this
study, the deep MLP’s architecture was comprised of seven layers and number
of neurons as follows: 20, 40, 60, 80, 40, 10, 1. From stage 3, the number of
epochs, learning rate and batch size are optimised and used during the train-
ing of the deep model, with the data from Stage 2 split into 80% and 20% for
training and testing respectively.
– Stage 5: Performance measure:
In the final stage, the performance of the finalised deep MLP model is gauged by
parsing the testing set and obtaining the following metrics: accuracy, precision,
recall, false positive and negative rates and F-measure. In the following two
subsections, Stages 3-5 are discussed in more detail.
3.1 Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) Algorithm for deep learning
parameter estimations
Originally inspired by observing the movement of animal swarms in their natural
habitat, Particle Swarm Optimisation (PSO) is a metaheuristic evolutionary algo-
rithm, that spawns a pre-determined number of particles (P ) that are randomly
initialized and set to traverse a variable’s search space (v).
During a particle’s propagation through the search space, each new position
(vt+1) is evaluated by the output of an objective function, which may change based
on the problem being optimised. A particle is defined by four values (Equation 4),
its velocity (vt) current position (xt), its local best (xlbest) and the swarm’s best
position (xgbest), as given in Equations 3,5,6.
P = p1, p2, . . . , pn, n ∈ N (3)
∀pn ∈ P, pn = (xt, vt, xlbest, xgbest) (4)
vt+1 = vt + θ1 ∗ rand ∗ (xlbest − xt) + θ2 ∗ rand ∗ (xgbest − xt), rand ∈ [0, 1] (5)
xt+1 = xt + vt+1 (6)
In Equation 5, vt+1 a particle’s new velocity is determined by its previous veloc-
ity vt, a random (rand) proportion of the learning rates θ1, θ2 and the differences
(distance) of its current position to its local and the swarm’s best positions. Equa-
tion 6 gives the updated position of a particle xt+1, determined by its previous
position xt and its current velocity. Next, Algorithm 1 depicts an iteration of the
PSO algorithm used to maximise the AUC of a deep model [45].
The PSO algorithm depicted in Algorithm 1, is set to maximise the AUC of a
deep MLP model, in order to determine the optimal values for the three hyperpa-
rameters: learning rate, epochs and batch size, by separately traversing their search
spaces.
Algorithm 1: Particle Swarm Optimization maximization algorithm
P ← construct particles(n particles);
∀ p ∈ P, p.Xlbest = p.x0, p.Xgbest = −∞;
epochs ← load epochs();
e←0;
while e <epochs do
foreach p ∈ P do
vt+1 = vt + θ1 ∗ rand ∗ (xlbest − xt) + θ2 ∗ rand ∗ (xgbest − xt), rand ∈ [0, 1];
xt+1 = xt + vt+1;
if xt+1 >xlbest then
xlbest=xt+1;
end
if xt+1 >xgbest then
xgbest=xt+1;
end
end
end
return P.global best()
There are a number of reasons that support the selection of PSO algorithm in-
place of another evolutionary metaheuristic algorithm for hyperparameter tuning.
To begin with, it has been established that PSO often converges faster than alterna-
tives [63] and can produce acceptable results in realistic time [64]. Furthermore, its
algorithm is readily understood and implemented [65]. Finally, this work provides
empirical information about the performance of PSO for hyperparameter tuning,
in the context of deep learning and network forensics, as our research indicates this
is the first time it has been applied to the task.
3.2 Proposed Particle Deep Framework for Network Forensics
The novel PDF is a considerable inclusion in the discipline of network forensics,
overlapping with the stages of network forensics, collection, preservation, examina-
tion and analysis and presentation, as depicted in Figure 2. The proposed frame-
work takes advantage of a deep neural network’s multiple layers, which enhance the
model’s performance while maintaining the execution time within reason.
Fig. 2. Stages of investigation in network forensics including the proposed framework
Algorithm 2: Particle deep model for hyperparameter estimation of deep
learning
Data:
nn ← load neural network structure() ;
[b,e,lr] ← initialize random hyperparameters() ;
hyperparameters ← [b,e,lr] ;
PS ← construct particle swarm(n particles,swarm epochs) ;
i ← 0 ;
foreach h1 ∈ hyperparameters do
while PS.swarm epochs 6= 0 do
h1 ← PS.maximize(nn.AUC, h1)usingalgorithm1;
end
nn.save opt hyperparam((h1)) ;
end
nn.train NN(training set());
In Algorithm 2 we depict a Particle Deep Framework (PDF) iteration. First
the neural network is loaded with its pre-selected layers and number of neurons.
Initially, the three hyperparameters batch size, number of epochs and learning rate
[b,e,lr] are randomly initialized. Next a particle swarm comprised of a pre-selected
number of particles (n particles) and number of iterations (swarm epochs) is gen-
erated. Then algorithm 1 is utilized to identify the value of the hyperparameters
that are being optimized and maximize the AUC value of the neural network
(h1 ← PS.maximize(nn.AUC, h1)). The process is repeated for every hyperpa-
rameter that is being optimized, the identified values of which are utilized to train
the final neural network.
To validate the optimised deep MLP model, we selected the Bot-IoT [57], as it
is a contemporary dataset that combines IoT and non-IoT traces and attacks. The
dataset was partitioned 80% and 20% sets for training and respectively. The features
of both training and testing sets were normalized with min-max in a range between
[0,1]. As there exists no standard procedure for selecting optimal hyperparameters,
at first, the values were manually selected and the deep MLP model trained, after
which we employed the PDF as given by Algorithm 2.
The performance of a neural network can be greatly affected by the hyper-
parameters. In this study, we focus on optimising three, learning rate, batch size
and epochs. The learning rate is a decimal between ’0’ and ’1’, that regulates the
rate of change of the weights during training. The batch size determines how many
records are processed before the neural network’s weights are updated, and the
number of epochs is the times that the entire dataset is processed by the network
during training. In the PDF, as is evident in Algorithm 2, each hyperparameter
is optimised separately, in order to reduce the search space that each PSO would
need to traverse. Otherwise, the search space would be equal to Batch size Size *
Epochs Size * Learning rate Size.
Because the deep model performed binary classification between normal and
attack traffic, the logistic cost function was selected [66], with its equation given
below. In addition, due to class imbalances in the Bot-IoT dataset, weights were
introduced in order to counter any detrimental effects they might have had to the
classifier’s performances.
C = − 1
m
m∑
i=1
(yi log(yˆi) + (1− yi) log(1− yˆi)) (7)
With m being the number of records in each batch, yi being the real value and
yˆi the estimated value of the class feature of the i
th record.
Introducing the new weights to counter the imbalanced data, alter the logistic
cost equation like so: w1yilog(yˆi) + w0(1 − yi)log(1 − yˆi), where w0 is the weight
for normal and w1 for attack records. During a PSO iteration, a particle reaches a
new location and trains a version of the MLP, using its new location as a hyper-
parameter, preserving values that improve the model’s performance. The process
of training and testing a deep MLP model using the PDF is given in Algorithm
Algorithm 3. As the AUC value is used to determine the wellness of a hyperparam-
eter, requiring the MLP to be trained beforehand, the PDF execution time may
be excessive, with recorded times for our experiments and for each hyperparameter
being: 4 hours for batch, 3 hours for epochs and 4 for learning rate optimisation. In
addition, 7 minutes were required to train the final MLP model, while its through-
put was 14,762 records/second. The complexity of the proposed PDF used to adjust
one hyperparameter and for each iteration is equal to O(np ∗ (mlp + 1), with np
denoting the number of particles spawned by the PSO and mlp the time complexity
for training and testing an MLP model.
Algorithm 3: Steps for training and testing the proposed particle deep model
Data:
S = 0 :′ batch′, 1 :′ epochs′, 2 :′ learningrate′;
Results = ′batch′ : −1,′ epochs′ : −1,′ learningrate′ : −1;
NN = loadNNstructure()#Hyperparameters that aren
′t trained;
n p = 6#number of particles;
n e = 4#number of epochs;
Results = randomInitialState();
task = ‘maximize AUC′;
for k = 0; k <= 2; k + + do
#Runs once for each hyperparameter to optimize;
particles = generateParticles(n p, n e);
bestHyper = runPSO(particles, task, S[k], NN);
Results[S[k]] = bestHyper;
end
#trains a model with the identified hyperparameters;
trainedNN = trainNN(NN,Results);
testNN(trainedNN);
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Dataset and evaluation metrics
The contemporary Bot-IoT dataset [57] was selected for training and testing the
proposed PDF. The Bot-IoT combines IoT and non-IoT traffic, representing a smart
home deployment, with the former generated by using Node-Red [67] and the en-
tire dataset reaching 72.000.000 records and a total of 16.7 GB for its csv format.
Specifically, we employed the ”10-best feature” version of the Bot-IoT dataset,
from which we utilised 2.934.817 records for training (80%) and 733.705 records
for testing (20%). For evaluation purposes, we selected six metrics, accuracy, pre-
cision, recall, FPR, FNR, F-measure. Accuracy represents the fraction of correctly
classified records (TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN), precision is the fraction of pre-
dicted as ”positive” records which were correctly identified TP/(TP +FP ). Recall
is the fraction of records correctly identified as ”positive” from all positive records
TP/(TP + FN), the FPR and FNR are the fractions fo records incorrectly classi-
fied as ”positive” (FP/(FP + TN)) or ”negative” (FN/(FN + TP )) respectively.
Finally, the F-measure is a measure of a model’s accuracy, produced by calculating
the harmonic mean of the precision and recall values 2TP/(2TP + FP + FN).
The three main attack categories represented in the dataset are Denial of Service,
information theft and information gathering attacks, with each category further
specialized into subtypes as explained here [57].
Experiments were performed on a laptop equipped with 16 GB RAM, Intel Core
i7-6700HQ CPU @2.6GHz, and the programming language used for designing and
training the deep MLP model and utilising PSO for hyperparameter optimisation
was python. The packages that were used in this python environment were as
follows: for data pre-processing Numpy and Pandas, for implementing the deep
MLP TensorFlow accessed through Keras and for defining and running the PSO
hyperparameter optimisation, Optunity[68].
4.2 Experiments
This subsection describes the results obtained through experimentation and testing
the Particle Deep Framework (PDF) by employing the evaluation metrics described
in the previous subsection. The deep neural network architecture that was chosen is
that of the deep MLP, as MLP networks have been shown to be simple, powerful and
flexible models, having the ability to model non-linear relations in data [69,70]. The
hyperparameters and architectures of the neural networks that were evaluated are
given in Table 1, with the activation function for the hidden layers and the output
layer being ”relu” and ”sigmoid” respectively. For the MLP’s weight initialization
we used the glorot uniform.
In addition to an optimised MLP, a feature-compressing method was tested, in
order to investigate its effects on the deep model’s performance. At first, the fea-
tures are converted by using the Normal distribution’s probability density function,
then for each record, weights are applied, which are obtained by calculating the av-
erage of the correlation coefficient matrix of the features, finally combining the
resulting values by adding and normalising them (min-max). As was already men-
tioned, we applied weights to compensate for the class imbalances of the Bot-IoT
dataset. Specifically, we used ”1” for attack records and ”4500” for normal records.
Furthermore, we specified fixed values for the random seeds used by the python
implementation of MLP and PSO (Keras, TensorFLow and Optunity) to make the
results reproducible. The results of our experiments, including the application of
the PDF, are displayed in Table 1.
The three neural networks depicted in Table 1 are further discussed here. First,
(i) is an unoptimized neural network, trained on randomly chosen hyperparame-
ters. Its high accuracy value is misleading, as its false-positive rate is just under
89% which is achieved due to class imbalances. Second, (ii) is an MLP, that was
trained by using the PDF and data that has been compressed by combining the
features into one, as was previously described in this subsection. The justification
for investigating a compression method for the features was to reduce the training
time. Although the model’s accuracy was slightly reduced to 95%, compared to the
unoptimised version of this MLP, its false-positive rate was considerably reduced to
8% with its false-negative rate increased to 5% respectively. Finally, (iii) is an MLP
with optimised hyperparameters, that was trained and tested by using the PDF,
on the original 13-feature Bot-IoT dataset. This MLP outperformed the other two
versions, achieving false positive and negative rates close to ’0’, while maintaining
an accuracy of 99.9% and a precision of ’1’.
A number of reasons can clarify why the 13-feature MLP (iii) outperformed the
compressed, single-feature MLP (ii). The single-feature MLP was trained on data
that compressed the input features, which may have resulted in considerable infor-
mation loss. Furthermore, the 13-feature MLP (iii) incorporates 240 more trainable
weights than the single-feature MLP (ii) between the input and first hidden layers,
allowing (iii) to detect even more complex patterns in the data than (ii).
Table 1. Neural Networks that were trained.
(i) Unoptimized
NN
(ii) Optimized NN
with compressed in-
put
(iii) Optimized NN
with 13-features in-
put
Neurons per
layer
13, 20, 40, 60, 80,
40, 10, 1
1, 20, 40, 60, 80, 40,
10, 1
13, 20, 40, 60, 80,
40, 10, 1
Epochs 2 12 12
Batch size 350 3064 732
Learning rate 0.2 0.0015 0.0015
Accuracy 0.999 0.947 0.999
Precision 0.999 0.999 1
Recall 0.999 0.947 0.999
FPR 0.884 0.081 0
FNR 9.269*10−5 0.052 9.541*10−5
F-measure 0.999 0.973 0.999
Fig. 3. (i) Unoptimized NN
Fig. 4. (ii) Optimized NN with compressed
input
Fig. 5. (iii) Optimized NN with 13-features input
5 Advantages and limitations
One advantage of the PDF is that it automates the hyperparameter tuning process,
which originally was manual. Furthermore, the collection stage is carried out by
reliable software that has seen wide use in industry. Additionally, the preservation
stage is addressed, by using a cryptographic hashing algorithm, thus providing a
mechanism to validate the integrity of data, the lack of which can cause a forensic
investigation to be dismissed.
A limitation of the PDF, is that it requires considerable time to train a deep
MLP model. This occurs because each particle trains an MLP on different hyper-
parameters, thus the size of the dataset, the number of layers and neurons of the
MLP and the number of particles used in the swarm will increase time require-
ments. Furthermore, the PDF processes network flow data, thus any information
in the body of collected packets is overlooked. In addition, countering spoofing at-
tacks, that alter the IP address of the attacker, is challenging and may hinder an
investigation.
6 Conclusion
Due to the swift adoption of IoT systems by industry and the general public, attacks
targeting IoT networks have been increasing. This paper proposes a novel network
forensics framework Called Particle Deep Framework (PDF) for the detection and
analysis of cyber-attacks in IoT networks. First, the components of the PDF and its
correspondence to the forensic stages were explained. In its core, the PDF combined
Deep Learning as the base model and Particle Swarm Optimisation for tuning
its hyperparameters, with the contemporary Bot-IoT dataset used to validate its
performance. The PDF achieved very high attack detection accuracy, at 99.9%, with
false positive and negative rates approaching zero, while its classification speed was
measured at 14,762 flows per second. As future work, we intend to expand the PSO’s
functionality, by adjusting it to process multiple hyperparameters, as-well-as test
its effectiveness against other IoT deployments, like smart health networks.
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